eterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons in container freight is critical. Previous work has suggested that such deterrence could be achieved by retaliation threats and partial inspection. However, pre-event declared retaliation threats may not be credible, causing the desired deterrence not to be achieved. In this paper, we extend and complement the work of Haphuriwat et al. (2011) to model credible retaliation threats in a three-stage game, by introducing two additional decision variables and five additional parameters. Our results suggest that noncredible retaliation could be at equilibrium when the reputation loss is low, the reward from the public for retaliation is low, or the costs of retaliation are high. When the declared retaliations are noncredible, we quantitatively show that a higher inspection level would be required to deter nuclear smuggling than would be needed if retaliation threats are always credible. This paper provides additional quantitative insights on the decision-making process for container screening to deter nuclear smuggling.
Introduction
Recently, Haphuriwat et al. (2011) studied deterrence of nuclear smuggling through both retaliation threats and partial inspection. This topic is appealing since retaliation has not been extensively studied in the literature of defender-attacker games. However, Haphuriwat et al. (2011) did not consider the costs of retaliation and assume that the declared retaliation is credible (in stage 1 of their two-stage game; see Figure 1 for the detailed game tree) and committed after a smuggling attempt (in stage 2 of their game). This assumption might not always hold, especially when the (material and political) costs of retaliation are extremely high. The problem of making credible retaliation threats in deterring nuclear smugglers is important because if the declared threat is not credible, partial inspection without considering retaliation credibility may not achieve deterrent effects against nuclear smuggling despite declared threats; that is, nuclear smugglers who are threatened with retaliation from a declared threat may not be deterred by partial inspection if they think the threat is not credible. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate the circumstances under which the defender's retaliation threat is credible and how the associated players' optimal decisions might change as a result.
To our knowledge, few researchers have studied the credibility of retaliation threats in smuggling games involving nuclear weapons. One notable exception is Schelling (1984, Chapter 14) , which studies nuclear terrorism and deterrence. This paper contributes to the literature of deterrence against nuclear smuggling by studying the required conditions for both credible and noncredible retaliation threats, and quantifying the associated optimal levels of container inspection. In particular, we extend and complement the work of Haphuriwat et al. (2011) by modeling credible retaliation threats in a three-stage game (where the defender retaliate in stage 3), by introducing two additional decision variables (whether to retaliate in stage 3 after either a successful or foiled smuggling attempt) and 44 Decision Analysis 11(1), pp. 43-62, © 2014 INFORMS five additional parameters (costs and rewards of retaliation and declaration cost). They are introduced and discussed in detail in §2 along with detailed game trees from both Haphuriwat et al. (2011) and the current paper.
Research on deterrence can be traced back to the Cold War. The credibility of retaliation for the period of the Cold War has been extensively examined in the game-theoretic literature (Schelling 1984 (Schelling , 2008 . The classic entrant game for a monopoly market is a typical example of noncredible threats (Kreps 1990 ). Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) discuss credible threats as containing two components: a plan of sequenced actions and the commitment to make the threat credible. These authors use game-theoretic reasoning to reach important insights without formal mathematical analysis. However, mathematical formalism could potentially lead to more quantitative insights.
The effectiveness of the post-Cold War deterrence policy against nuclear threats is under debate. Goldstein (2000) focuses on international relationships and argues that nuclear deterrence is still a key component of security policies of global superpowers and an alternative for less powerful countries who have concerns about more capable adversaries. However, unlike the Cold War, when most critical infrastructures in both the United States and the Soviet Union had nowhere to hide after launching a nuclear attack, terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda have no such concerns (Allison 2005) . By contrast, a number of researchers argue that many terrorist groups might be deterred by properly designed deterrence policies (Trager and Zagorcheva 2006) due to the terrorists' strategic nature. (Marshall 2012, p. 821) states: "It's now clear that many terrorists are well-educated and seemingly rational." National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004, p. 383) concludes: "Our report shows that the terrorists analyze defenses. They plan accordingly." Moreover, Haller (2013, p. vii) states: " current adversaries may be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons differently than were Cold War adversaries." Therefore, those authors suggest that at least some terrorists seem strategic and might be deterred. Note that nuclear smuggling and attack need special attention given their potentially severe consequences.
Although some terrorists, such as suicide bombers, appear irrational and willing to die, they are probably willing to sacrifice their lives for a greater cause and thus still make strategic decisions. For example, (Knopf 2010, p. 13) discusses: "Colin Gray points out that, despite the grandiosity of its objectives, Al Qaeda 'functions strategically' in trying to use its suicide attacks to advance those objectives. As a result, 'It can be deterred by the fact and expectation of strategic failure.' " Moreover, even though operating personnel of terrorist activities are willing to die, terrorist group leaders may be deterred by strategically designed retaliation policies. When deciding whether to attempt to smuggle nuclear weapons into the United States, the smuggler would probably consider the possibility of failure as well as the potentially high penalty cost.
On the other side, the United States does retaliate against terrorist attacks. For example, on October 7, 2001 (about four weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks), the United States sent troops to Afghanistan to attack Al Qaeda camps supported by the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. "Bush said the action was taken after the Taliban refused to meet several non-negotiable American demands . 'None of these demands was met, and now, the Taliban will pay a price,' he said" (CNN 2001) . Moreover, the constant hunting and final killing of Al Qaeda's leader Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011, is another example of retaliation (Miller 2011 , Helene 2011 . We envision that any nuclear terrorist attacks on U.S. soil would lead to severe retaliation efforts by the United States.
A properly designed and declared retaliation policy could inflict a potentially high penalty cost on a terrorist group that is seeking a rogue state sponsor. There are two main ways for terrorists to obtain nuclear materials or weapons from a state sponsor: (a) a rogue state willingly gives them to the terrorist group or (b) the terrorist group steals them from a nation that lacks secure methods protecting nuclear materials or weapons. Levi (2004) suggests a declared retaliation policy against the nation where the nuclear weapons originate. With the rapid advance in technology, traces of any debris from a nuclear attack could potentially reveal its origin. Therefore, out of the fear of potentially severe retaliation, the rogue state would make the cost of a terrorist group seeking nuclear sponsorship extremely high (such as increasing terrorist operating costs by interdicting terrorist activities). Downloaded from informs.org by [8.37.51 .67] on 27 February 2014, at 13:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
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Knopf (2010) discusses three categories of deterrent approaches against terrorists, which are related to the assumption about nuclear smugglers' behavior in the current paper. The first category is referred to as "indirect deterrence," where the retaliation targets are not terrorists per se, but the terrorists' state sponsor or financier. The second category is "deterrence by denial," which translates to inspecting every incoming container in border security. The full inspection level is neither necessary nor economical, as discussed in Wang and Zhuang (2011) . That serves as one of the motivations of this paper, that is, to study how to deter the smuggling of nuclear weapons by partial inspection and credible retaliation threats and what would happen when credibility fails. In §3, we show that in some cases, inspecting all containers is a requirement to deter smuggling attempts, which is similar to "deterrence by denial." The third category is "punishing terrorists, by threatening societal targets." The key with the third category is to identify appropriate societal targets to effectively deter terrorists (Knopf 2010) .
Decision analytical models have made significant contributions to homeland security research. Within the context of border security (e.g., container inspection), Morton et al. (2007) study where to locate radiation sensors to interdict the smuggling of nuclear materials. Bakır (2008) uses decision trees to evaluate countermeasures in cargo security. Merrick and McLay (2010) study screening as a deterrence method using a nongame-theoretic model. Bier and Haphuriwat (2011) and Wang and Zhuang (2011) suggest that deterrence could be achieved by partial inspection. Besides border security, a portion of the limited amount of defensive resources against an adaptive adversary is dedicated to target hardening (Zhuang and Bier 2007) . Choosing optimal levels of defense for a given target requires the understanding of the adversary's objective, which could contain multiple attributes (Keeney 2007 , Keeney and von Winterfeldt 2011 , Wang and Bier 2011 . Robust (e.g., Nikoofal and Zhuang 2012) , multiple-stage (where only one player moves in each stage; e.g., Brown et al. 2006, Hausken and Zhuang 2011b) , and multiple-period (where both players move in each period; e.g., Hausken and Zhuang 2011a , Zhuang et al. 2010 , Jose and Zhuang 2013 games between attackers and defenders have been studied. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: §2 extends the game-theoretic model in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) and compares the equilibrium strategies in the two models. Section 3 illustrates the model with the real data that are used in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) . Section 4 concludes and provides some future research directions. The appendix provides the solution procedure to the model, additional solution explanations, the proofs for the propositions, and additional numerical illustrations. Haphuriwat et al. (2011) 2.1. Notation, Definition of Credible Retaliation, and Assumptions Haphuriwat et al. (2011) develop a two-stage nuclear smuggling game, where the defender decides on whether to declare retaliation and how many containers to inspect in stage 1, and the smuggler decides on whether to smuggle a nuclear weapon in stage 2 (see Figure 1 (a) for a detailed game tree). We extend the model in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) to a three-stage game by introducing two additional defender's decision variables (whether to retaliate in stage 3, D s , where s is an indicator variable for the outcome of a smuggling attempt and equals 1 if successful or 0 if foiled) and five additional parameters (reward/cost of retaliation, c D 1 s D 3 , where s = 1 or 0 and D 1 and D 3 are the defender's stage 1 and 3 declaration or retaliation decisions, respectively, and retaliation declaration cost e).
Extending the Model in
In particular, the defender's stage 3 decision is denoted by D s (where s = 1 or 0) when the defender decides to retaliate after either a successful (s = 1) or foiled (s = 0) attempt (see Figure 1 (b) for a detailed game tree and see the three-stage game described in §2.3). Reward/cost of retaliation is represented by c 1 1 1 , c 1 1 0 , c 1 0 1 , and c 1 0 0 . For example, we have c 1 1 0 as the cost of not retaliating in stage 3 after the defender declares retaliation in stage 1 and the attempted smuggling was successful. All notation (decision variables, parameters, variables, thresholds, conditions, and required inspection levels) are listed and explained in Table 1 Parameters in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) N > 0 Total number of containers m > 0 Number of nuclear bombs involved in a single smuggling attempt; we assume that m = 1 throughout the paper except in §2.5, and §A.7 of the appendix, where we compare the solution with that in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) v > 0 Expected damage if at least one nuclear weapon is successfully smuggled into the U.S.
Cost to the defender of inspecting a container a > 0 Cost of acquiring and smuggling a nuclear weapon > 0 Parameter reflecting economies of scale in acquiring multiple nuclear weapons; we assume that = 1 throughout the paper except in §2.5, where we compare the solution to the extended model with that in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) p ∈ 0 1 Conditional probability of successfully detecting a nuclear bomb, given inspection of a container that contains a bomb r s > 0 Cost to the defender of retaliation after s k A s ≥ 0 Cost to the smuggler of retaliation after s New thresholds and conditions
; condition 7 in Figure 2 Downloaded from informs.org by [8.37.51 .67] on 27 February 2014, at 13:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. New required inspection level
; threshold 1 for n in Figures 2-3
; threshold 3 for n in Figure 2 n
; threshold 4 for n in Figure 2 in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) 1 and those that are newly introduced in this paper.
We acknowledge that the effectiveness of retaliation threats in deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons is controversial, as discussed in §1. In this paper, we assume that retaliation against the smuggler itself or the state supplier of the nuclear weapons would cause a significantly high penalty cost in the smuggler's utility function (assuming retaliation against the state supplier of the nuclear weapons would indirectly pose a heavy toll on the smuggler, such as difficulty in terrorist operations causing a significantly increased operating cost). Furthermore, retaliation against terrorist group leaders might have such an effect as well.
An alternative to a three-stage game, as studied in this paper, is that when declaring retaliation threats, the defender binds herself to retaliate using mechanisms such as a trip wire in stage 1, and thus does not have the option not to retaliate, which eliminates stage 3 of the game. Note that the modeling framework developed in this paper is general and is able to account for the possibility of binding oneself to respond. Mechanisms such as a trip wire could still be compatible with this paper in the sense of being modeled as sufficiently high cost of breaking the promise to retaliate (i.e., high levels of c 1 1 0 and c 1 0 0 ) so that making noncredible threats is never part of the defender's equilibrium strategy.
1 The notation used in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) Definition 1. A retaliation threat is credible if one of the following three conditions is satisfied at equilibrium:
Remark 1. Case (a) corresponds to credible retaliation threats against both a successful and a foiled smuggling attempt. Case (b) corresponds to a credible threat against a successful smuggling attempt, but no threat against a foiled smuggling attempt. Case (c) corresponds to a credible threat against a foiled smuggling attempt, but no threat against a successful smuggling attempt. If D 1 = D 1 = D 0 = D 0 = 0, the defender does not declare retaliation and does not retaliate against a successful or foiled smuggling attempt. If Figure 1 (a) depicts the game tree that is implicitly used in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) , where declared retaliation is assumed to be carried out. Figure 1 (b) presents an extended game tree modeling credible threats, where the defender first declares whether to retaliate and chooses an inspection level, the smuggler then decides whether to smuggle nuclear weapons, and, finally, the defender decides whether to actually retaliate.
Comparing the Game Trees
There are two main differences between the two trees: First, the tree in Figure 1 (a) depicts a two-stage game with 12 terminal nodes where the defender decides in stage 1 only, whereas the tree in Figure 1 Subgame II where the defender decides in both stages 1 and 3. Second, retaliation threats are assumed to be credible in the game tree from Figure 1 (a), and thus there are six terminal nodes of credible threat (" "), three terminal nodes of not-implemented threat (" "; no smuggling attempt follows the declared retaliation, and therefore the declared retaliation is not implemented), and three terminal nodes of no threat (" "). In contrast, in Figure 1 (b), there are six terminal nodes of credible threat (" "), six terminal nodes of noncredible threat ("•"), three terminal nodes of not-implemented threats (" "), and five terminal nodes of no threat (" ").
The Extended Model
In this section, we describe the extended model as illustrated in Figure 1 (b) . There are three stages of decision making. In stage 1, the defender decides whether to declare retaliation against a successful and/or foiled smuggling attempt and how many containers to inspect. In stage 2, the smuggler decides whether to attempt smuggling nuclear weapons. Finally, in stage 3, the Downloaded from informs.org by [8.37.51 .67] on 27 February 2014, at 13:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
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defender decides whether to launch actual retaliation if either a successful or a foiled smuggling attempt happens. Note that we focus on the case where m = 1 throughout this paper, except in §2.5 and §A.7 of the appendix, where we compare the solution to the extended model with that in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) .
We assume that the defender's objective in stage 1 is to minimize the total expected losses, including loss from a successful smuggling attempt, the retaliation cost (either after a successful smuggling attempt or a foiled smuggling attempt), the reward or reputation loss (cost) from keeping or breaking the promise about retaliation, the inspection cost, and the cost of retaliation declaration:
Stage 1 min
In stage 2, the smuggler chooses whether to smuggle (using decision variable A ∈ 0 1 ). This decision is contingent upon the smuggler's reasoning about the defender's decision in stage 3, to maximize the expected loss minus possible retaliation cost and smuggling cost; that is
, the smuggler will smuggle; otherwise, the smuggler will not smuggle. Mathematically, we have: 
In Haphuriwat et al. (2011) , the planned retaliation is fully committed after a smuggling attempt, and thus the smuggler's decision in stage 2 is only a function of the defender's decision in stage 1. In this paper, when the smuggler makes a decision of whether to attempt to smuggle a nuclear weapon, the smuggler takes into consideration the credibility of retaliation threats.
In stage 3, the defender decides whether to retaliate to minimize the retaliation cost minus reward (or plus reputation loss) from keeping (or breaking) the promise about retaliation:
Stage 3 min
reward or reputation loss where s = 1 or 0.
Solution to the Extended Model
We first solve the four subgames in Figure 1 (b) separately as documented in §A.1 of the appendix and then solve the entire game using backward induction to get the equilibrium solution, which prescribes the optimal strategies and payoffs for all players (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) . In particular, the optimal response of the defender in s3 is as follows:
where s = 1 or 0. Recall that when the credibility of the defender's declared retaliation policy (stage 1 decision) is considered, what the smuggler thinks the response will actually be (D 3 ) is also a function of what the defender said it would be (D 1 ).
With backward induction, we use the optimal response of the defender in stage 3 to solve for the optimal decision for the smuggler in stage 2. In particular, we have:
According to the values of r 1 and r 0 , we divide the parameter space into four regions as shown in Downloaded from informs.org by [8.37.51 .67] on 27 February 2014, at 13:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. Table 2 Conditions for Credible Threats Figure 2 , which presents the solution to the game tree in Figure 1 (b) using thresholds T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , and n 4 and conditions C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 , C 6 , and C 7 as defined in Table 1 . In particular, Regions I-IV of Figure 2 correspond to four events: (I) the costs of retaliation against both successful and foiled attempts are less than the lost reputation of not retaliating; (II) the cost of retaliation against a successful attempt is less than the lost reputation of not retaliating, whereas the cost of retaliation against a foiled attempt is equal to or more than the lost reputation of not retaliating; (III) the cost of retaliation against a successful attempt is equal to or more than the lost reputation of not retaliating, whereas the cost of retaliation against a foiled attempt is less than the lost reputation of not retaliating; and (IV) the costs of retaliation against both successful and foiled attempts are equal to or more than the lost reputation of not retaliating. That is, Regions I-IV correspond to (I) {r 1 < c 1 1 0 − c 1 1 1 and r 0 < Table 2 holds.
Conditions
Remark 2. Proposition 1 implies that when the costs of retaliation (r s ) are low, the reputation loss (c 1 s 0 ) is high, or the reward from the public for retaliation against a smuggling attempt (c 1 s 1 ) is high (more negative), we have all three types of credible retaliation threats as shown in Region I.2-I.3 of Figure 2 (type (a) in I.2 and I.3; types (a), (b), and (c) in I.3). Since the costs of retaliation to the defender are lower than the reputation loss if the defender breaks the promise to retaliate plus the reward from the public of keeping the promise to retaliate, the defender will always commit to retaliation after either a successful or foiled smuggling attempt. As a result, we have all three types of credible retaliation threats, depending on the defender's decision at s 1 (declaring retaliations against a successful and/or foiled smuggling attempt). When r s < c 1 s 0 − c 1 s 1 for either s = 1 or 0 is not satisfied, we could have both credible and noncredible retaliation threats at equilibrium, as shown in Regions II.2-II.3 and III.2 of Figure 2 . When r s < c 1 s 0 − c 1 s 1 for both s = 1 and 0 is not satisfied (retaliation is too costly or not worthy as compared to reputation loss from breaking the promise to retaliate or reward from keeping the promise to retaliate), there does not exist any retaliation threat at equilibrium as shown in Region IV.2 of Figure 2 .
In addition, when the smuggling cost is moderate (T 1 < a ≤ T 2 ), a set of strategies of retaliation declaration and inspection would effectively deter the smuggler, as shown in Regions I.2, II.2, and III.2 of Figure 2 . In contrast, when the smuggling cost is relatively high (T 2 < a ≤ T 3 ), declared retaliation would be sufficiently effective to deter the smuggling attempts, as shown in Regions I.3 and II.3 of Figure 2 . Section A.5 of the appendix provides additional explanations to solutions to Regions II-IV in Figure 2. Haphuriwat et al. (2011) and That in This Paper In this section, we compare the equilibrium solution provided in Figure 2 with the solution provided in §3 of Haphuriwat et al. (2011) , whose Figure 1 is adapted in Figure 3 .
Comparing the Solution in
2 In Haphuriwat et al. (2011) , there is one condition (r s < c 1 s 0 − c 1 s 1 where s = 1 or 0) where retaliation threats are credible, corresponding to the left 75% of Region I of Figure 2 and illustrated in Figure 3 . In contrast, we have three additional conditions corresponding to Regions II-IV of Figure 2 , respectively. In Regions II-IV of Figure 2 , we have both credible and noncredible threats at equilibrium, and higher threshold inspection levels n would be employed to deter the smuggler. Solution to the Game Tree in Figure 1 (b) Using Thresholds T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , and n 1 ; Required Inspection Levels n 2 , n 3 , and n 4 ; and Conditions C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 , C 6 , and C 7 as Defined in Table 1 In particular, although Regions I.1-I.3 in Figure 2 are similar to Cases 1-3 in Figure 3 , there are two main differences between Region I in Figure 2 and Figure 3 . First, there is an additional case (Region I.4 in Figure 2 ), when the smuggling cost is high (a > T 3 ; this refers to the condition that the cost of smuggling is higher than level T 3 , which is specified in Table 1 ). In Region I.4, the defender does not desire to declare retaliation or inspect any cargo since the high smuggling cost alone will prevent the smuggler from smuggling nuclear weapons, whereas in Figure 3 it is assumed that retaliation declaration is free and therefore the defender would declare retaliation at equilibrium. Second, if the inspection cost is low (condition C 3 does not hold), in Region I.3 of Figure 2 , a certain inspection level (n = min N n 2 ) in this model can deter the smuggler, instead of declaring any retaliation as in Case 2 of Figures 3. In contrast, in Case 2 of Figure 3 (T 1 < a ≤ T 2 ), a paired strategy of retaliation threats and inspection (n = min N n 1 ) can deter the smuggler only if the threat is credible. If the threat is noncredible (r s > c 1 s 0 − c 1 s 1 for s = 1 or 0), the smuggler will not be deterred even if the defender inspects n = min N n 1 containers. In this case, the payoff of smuggling for the smuggler is v m a + Optimal Defender Strategies Adapted from Figure 1 of Haphuriwat et al. (2011) Using Threshold T 1 , Required Inspection Level n 1 , and Conditions C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 as Defined in Table 1 n
Note. This is similar to the left 75% of Region I in Figure 2 , except Region I.4, where high cost of smuggling alone is sufficient in deterring the smuggler.
see Lemma 1 in §A.6 of the appendix). Therefore, a smuggling attempt will happen since the defender declares a noncredible retaliation. Similarly, in Case 3 of Figure 3 , a threat of retaliation alone is sufficient in deterring smuggling assuming the threat is credible. However, if the threat is noncredible (r 1 > c 1 1 0 − c 1 1 1 ), the payoff of successfully smuggling nuclear weapons is v − m a, which could be greater than 0 as long as a is not too large. Therefore, a smuggling attempt could happen when the defender declares a noncredible retaliation and does not inspect any containers.
Proposition 2. At equilibrium, if the threats are noncredible, the threshold inspection level to deter smuggling (n * ) is higher than or equal to that if the threats are assumed to be credible. In particular:
• When a < T 1 , there is no retaliation threat, and the defender either inspects all the containers or none, depending on inspection cost d.
• When T 1 ≤ a < T 2 , -threshold n 2 (Region II.2 in Figure 2 ) ≥ threshold n 1 (Region I.2 in Figure 2) ; -threshold n 3 (Region II.2 in Figure 2 ) ≥ threshold n 1 (Region I.2 in Figure 2) ; -threshold n 4 (Region III.2 in Figure 2 ) ≥ threshold n 1 (Region I.2 in Figure 2 ).
• When T 2 ≤ a < T 3 , -threshold n 4 (Regions III.2 in Figure 2 ) > 0 (Region I.3 in Figure 2 ).
• When a ≥ T 3 , there is no retaliation and the defender does not inspect any containers.
Remark 3. Proposition 2 implies that if the threats to retaliate are noncredible, the defender must inspect more or the same number of containers to deter the smuggler. Proposition 2 is illustrated by the numerical examples in §3.
There are three regions where both credible and noncredible threats are at equilibrium: Regions II.2, II.3, and III.2 in Figure 2 . We use Region II.2 as an example. The reason for noncredible threats at equilibrium is that for both credible
threats, when the defender declares retaliation threats, which deter smuggling attempts together with inspecting n 3 containers, the payoff to the defender is the summation of the inspection cost and the declaration cost (including research cost on how to develop an effective retaliatory policy) and does not differ between credible and noncredible threats. Note that we do not differentiate the declaration costs between successful and foiled smuggling attempts. Therefore, as long as the defender declares the retaliatory policy and inspects the min N n 3 containers, the smuggler is deterred, and noncredible threats can be achieved at equilibrium (the defender's stage 3 decisions were not actually made since the smuggling attempts would have been deterred). This implies that with partial inspection and retaliation threats, the smuggler would be deterred even if the retaliation could be noncredible (and thus never carried out).
Discussion
Game-theoretic models advise the defender regarding the optimal inspection level together with appropriately declared retaliatory policy to deter any smuggling attempts. There is some criticism regarding the assumptions and applications of game theory. For example, Axelrod (1997) states that the unrealistic assumptions of game theory limit its applications, and Poundstone (1992) Sandler and Arce 2003 , Cox 2009 and Hall 2009 ). Azad (2011) also comments: "Game theory has found its best application in the development of models of deterrence." To derive meaningful results, certain simplifying assumptions have to be made. In addition, research on behavioral game theory has been developed to address such comments by combining game-theoretic modeling and experimental approaches to make better predictions about human behavior (Camerer 2003) .
Furthermore, we acknowledge that the validity of defender-attacker game-theoretic models relies on their assumptions about the attacker's behavior. Traditional game-theoretic models based on the strong assumption that players are perfectly rational do not give a perfect description of the attacker's behavior and thus would be limited in their predictive power. However, defender-attacker games provide useful models to study the strategic interactions between parties with conflicting interests (e.g., Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 2004; Bier et al. 2008; Barrett 2010; Haphuriwat et al. 2011; Wang and Bier 2011; Sevillano et al. 2012; Shan and Zhuang 2013a, c) . Moreover, Yang et al. (2013) recently developed a new set of Stackelberg security games (which are successfully deployed in several important real-world security domains) coping with human attackers who are boundedly rational by incorporating prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and a stochastic discrete choice model (Train 2003 Shan and Zhuang (2013b) examined the nonstrategic behavior of the attacker with mathematical modeling. Using game theory, this current paper still yields some insights such as the finding that noncredible threats could be found at equilibrium.
Illustration of the Extended Model
To illustrate our extended model, we use the parameter estimates that are used in Haphuriwat et al. (2011) , as shown in Table 3 . Table 3 Parameter Proposition 3. All five additional parameters that are introduced in this paper (i.e., c 1 1 1 , c 1 1 0 , c 1 0 1 , c 1 0 0 , and e) will only have an impact on whether retaliation against successful or foiled smuggling attempts is credible, and will not influence the exact number of containers to inspect.
Remark 4. Proposition 3 implies that there is no need to estimate more parameters than Haphuriwat et al. (2011) when deciding how many containers to inspect. Recall that the definitions of required inspection levels do not contain the values of all five additional parameters that are introduced in this paper (i.e., c 1 1 1 , c 1 1 0 , c 1 0 1 , c 1 0 0 , and e). When the smuggler decides whether to smuggle, he compares his payoffs of smuggling and not smuggling (i.e., 0), which are functions of the inspection level (n) and the defender's decision (D 1 or D 0 ) in stage 3. Whereas the binary decision variables D 1 or D 0 affect the payoff and decision of the smuggler, the five additional parameters will only affect the defender's decision in stage 3. Therefore, those five additional parameters will only have an impact on whether there will be credible threats at equilibrium (as shown in Proposition 1), but will not influence the exact number of containers to inspect. Note that although the exact number of containers to inspect for deterrence differs depending on whether the retaliation threat is credible, the formulas used to calculate the exact number do not involve the five additional parameters. The insights from the model could not be reached by intuition; for example, the exact quantitative insights regarding the required inspection level for deterrence if the retaliation is not credible requires calculation. Figure 4 shows the required inspection levels when facing a smuggler attempting to smuggle in a single weapon with k A 0 = 0; Figure 5 shows the required inspection levels facing a smuggler attempting to smuggle in more than one weapon with k A 0 = $50 billion.
If retaliation after a successful smuggling attempt is credible, the required inspection levels are the same among panels (a)-(c) of Figure 4 , respectively. In these cases, partial inspection could successfully deter the smuggling attempts under many circumstances. In contrast, when retaliation against a successful smuggling attempt is not credible, a 100% level of inspection is always required in Figure 4 (d) and 4(e).
Similarly, if both types of retaliation are credible, the required inspection levels are the same between panels (a) and (b) of Figure 5 . In particular, retaliation after a foiled smuggling attempt significantly helps to achieve deterrence with partial inspection. However, if either of the two types of retaliation threats is not credible, a level of 100% inspection is required in all parameter ranges in Figure 5 (c)-5(e). Section A.7 of the appendix provides results for the case where m is greater than or equal to 1.
Conclusion and Future Research Directions

Conclusion
In this paper, we model the role of credible or noncredible retaliation threats in deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons. Previous research suggests deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons by retaliation threats and partial inspection. However, the credibility of such threats might influence the deterrence effects, which has not been extensively studied in the literature of deterrence against nuclear smuggling. In this paper, Downloaded from informs.org by [8.37.51 .67] on 27 February 2014, at 13:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. (2011) and modeling a three-stage game to study the credibility of retaliation threats and identify the conditions required for the threats to be credible. Specifically, our results show that credible retaliation could be an equilibrium strategy when the penalty from breaking the promise of retaliation (i.e., reputation loss) is high, the reward from retaliation is high, or the costs of retaliation are low. By contrast, noncredible retaliation could be an equilibrium strategy when the reputation loss is low, the reward from the public for retaliation is low, or the costs of retaliation are high. When the cost of retaliation to the smuggler against a foiled smuggling attempt is low, deterrence with partial inspection is difficult to achieve, even if the threat to retaliate against a successful smuggling attempt is credible. If the threat to retaliate against a successful smuggling attempt is not credible, a higher inspection level (e.g., 100%) would be required. In contrast, when the cost of retaliation to the smuggler against a foiled smuggling attempt is medium, deterrence through partial inspection becomes much more feasible, especially if the smuggler only attempts to smuggle in one weapon and the required inspection level becomes significantly lower. Therefore, it would be beneficial for the defender to declare retaliation against both a successful and a foiled smuggling attempt. If retaliation against either successful or foiled smuggling attempts is not credible, a higher inspection level (e.g., 100%) would be required.
Future Research Directions
In terms of future research directions, the strategic interactions of inspection and smuggling are likely to happen in a repeated game between the defender and the smuggler, as discussed in §6.5 of Haphuriwat et al. (2011) . Both players can learn from the outcomes of the previous periods and update their beliefs about some uncertainties such as costs and benefits of smuggling and/or retaliation. Retaliation benefits could come from the reduced attacking capacity in the future periods Downloaded from informs.org by [8.37.51 .67] on 27 February 2014, at 13:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
(increased attack unit costs or decreased attack budget). Considering discount factors in such multiperiod games might also yield some additional insights about myopic players. This paper focuses on how to deter smuggling attempts of nuclear weapons with retaliation threats and partial inspection in a one-period game, which incorporates the temporal effects of the reputation loss into the current payoff. The effects of retaliation after a smuggling attempt could include deterring future attacks, which could be studied with multiperiod games.
Games of incomplete information can also be investigated in the context of container inspection. One concern about deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons is that the cost of retaliation to the smuggler may not be sufficiently high to achieve deterrence effects. A Bayesian game, where the smuggler does not know the payoff of the defender, can be studied. In reality, as long as the terrorist believes that such cost could be sufficiently high with some high probability, such threats would be credible and thus could deter the smuggler.
Signaling games could also be incorporated into modeling credible retaliation in deterring smugglers. As studied by Zhuang et al. (2010) , deception could be an equilibrium strategy for the defender over truthful disclosure, especially when the smuggler is uncertain about some of the defender's attributes. In such cases, we expect that signals of possible retaliation may not always be credible, but could be part of equilibrium strategies involving deception.
We acknowledge that there are some terrorist groups who cannot be deterred by credible retaliation threats. There might be two main reasons: (1) the severity of retaliation is ignored by them, and (2) they intend to give the government the impression of being undeterrable to get the government to give up any deterrence efforts. Those two possibilities could be modeled by modifying the payoff to the smuggler. For instance, to model scenario (2), there would be a positive payoff to the smuggler when the smuggling attempt occurs given the defender declares a retaliation threat.
Another interesting extension is to consider the damage caused by smuggled nuclear weapons to be a function of the number of smuggled nuclear weapons. In particular, if a couple of nuclear weapons are detonated simultaneously in different cities, the potential damage could be much more than separating two nuclear attacks by time.
A.1. Solution to the Model as Specified in Figure 1(b)
In this section, we introduce two additional notation: U A (the utility of the smuggler) and U D (the disutility of the defender), which represent the total (expected) costs and payoffs in the right part of the game tree in Figure 1 • Region I.1 in Figure 2 , where a ≤ T 1 . I.1.1. In Subgame I in Figure 1 
Otherwise, the equilibrium strategy for the defender is to choose n = 0, D 1 = D 0 = D 1 = D 0 = 0, and the equilibrium payoff is v.
• Region I.3 in Figure 2 , where T 2 < a ≤ 
, and the equilibrium payoff is e.
• Region I.4 in Figure We observe that the equilibrium strategy for the defender is to choose n = 0,
• Region II.1. This region is identical to Region I.1 of Figure 2 .
• Region II.2 in Figure 2 , where T 1 < a ≤ T 2 . II.2. 1/m d + e. Otherwise, the optimal n = 0, and Subgame IV gives the minimal U D = v. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy for the defender is to choose n = 0, and the equilibrium payoff is U D = v.
• Region II.3 in Figure 
Otherwise, the optimal n = 0, and Subgames I and II give the minimal U D = e. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy for the defender is
• Region II.4 in Figure 2 , where a > T 3 . II.4. We observe that the equilibrium strategy for the defender is to choose n = 0,
• Region III.1. This region is identical to Region I.1 of Figure 2 .
• Region III.2 in Figure 2 , where T 1 < a ≤ T 3 . III.2. 
Otherwise, the optimal n = 0, and Subgame IV (D 1
• Region III.3 in Figure 2 , where a ≥ We observe that the equilibrium strategy for the defender is to choose n = 0,
• Region IV.1. This region is identical to Region I.1 of Figure 2 .
• Region IV.2 in Figure 2 , where T 1 < a ≤ T 3 . IV.2. Case c. If T 2 ≤ a < T 3 , Regions I and II in Figure 2 require inspecting no containers when the defender declares retaliation at equilibrium, whereas Region III requires inspecting min N n 4 containers when the defender declares retaliation at equilibrium, and Region IV requires inspecting no containers when the defender does not declare retaliation (the defender always chooses not to declare retaliation in Region IV). In other words, there are noncredible threats at equilibrium in Regions II and III, and the required inspection levels are 0 and n 4 , respectively. By definition of threshold inspection level n 4 in Table 1 , n 4 > 0. Therefore, we conclude that when T 2 ≤ a < T 3 , the threshold inspection level to deter smuggling (n * ) is higher if we have noncredible threats than if we have credible threats.
Case d. When a ≥ T 3 , the smuggler will not smuggle nuclear weapons due to the high cost. Therefore, the defender declares no retaliation threats, and the defender does not inspect any containers as shown in Regions I.4-IV.4 of Figure 2 .
In summary, we conclude that at equilibrium, the threshold inspection level to deter smuggling (n * ) if we have noncredible threats is higher than or equal to that if we have credible threats.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
The defender may need to inspect a certain number of containers to deter the smuggler from smuggling nuclear weapons. Depending upon the credibility of declared retaliation threats and other conditions, the required inspection level could be n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , or n 4 as introduced in Table 1 . However, none of them involve the newly introduced parameters (c 1 1 1 ,  c 1 1 1 , c 1 0 1 , c 1 0 1 , and e) . Therefore, the newly introduced parameters will not influence the defender's decision of how many containers to inspect to deter the smuggling attempts.
A.5. Additional Explanations to Solutions for
Regions II-IV in Figure 2 The solutions in Regions II.1 and II.4 of Figure 2 are identical to the ones in Regions I.1 and I.4, respectively. In Region II.2, depending upon inspection cost d, declaration cost e, and expected damage from a smuggled nuclear weapon v, the defender has the following equilibrium strategy: (a) If d is low (condition C 4 holds), n = min N n 2 is sufficient in deterring smugglers so that there is no need to declare A.7. When m Is Greater Than or Equal to 1 Figure A .1 compares required inspection levels (percentage) in Figure 5 of Haphuriwat et al. (2011) and the four regions in Figure 2 using the same baseline values with k A 0 = 0 and p = 0 9.
If retaliation after a successful attack is credible, the required inspection levels are the same among Figure A.1(a)-(c) . In these cases, partial inspection could successfully deter the smuggler under circumstances. In contrast, if retaliation against a successful attack is not credible, a 100% level of inspection is always required in Figure A 
